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A N

ANSWER

To a Late

PAMPHLET

ENTITLED,

Elements of Policy Civil and
Ecclesiastical, in a Mathemati-
cal Method.

By a Member of the HANOVERIAN
SOCIETY in OXFORD.

*If the Conclusions deduced therefrom are false,
the Argument consequently falls to the
Ground.*

Preface.

L O N D O N:

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A N

ANSWER

To a Late

PAMPHLET, &c.

***** Lavery is so vile and detestable a
 *  * Thing, so contrary to the Wel-
 * S * fare and Happiness of Man;
 * * that I cannot but wonder any
 ***** should be so fond of it, as to
 court a Prince to put a Yoke upon
their Necks, which neither they nor their Fa-
fathers were able to bear ; yet as detestable as
it is, and as destructive to the Publick as
well as Private Good, there are are not want-
ing Men among us that would perswade us
(contrary to all Sense and Reason) that
Princes have a Divine Right to Absolute Power,
and must not be resisted even in Cases of

extreme Necessity. But that God should put all Men into such a State of Slavery, only to be the Subjects of *Arbitrary Wills*, and the slavish Instruments of gratifying the wicked Designs of one or more ambitious Men, is such a senseless Blasphemy against the Goodness of God, that I wonder any can favour so absurd a Position. Not to mention, that those *Non-resisting Doctors*, at a time when an *unnatural Rebellion* was in the Nation, and consequently the fittest time, if ever, for this Doctrine, I do not say encouraged it, yet I may say, few, if any, dissuaded from it: But now, when it is over, and consequently no need of it, since (God be thanked) the Pretender's Designs have miscarried; least our unnatural Feuds should be too soon appeas'd, and the People not be prepared for Arbitrary Government, if ever God for our Sins should suffer it to take Place among us, the desponding Cause is again renew'd, and that to make it the more plausible in a new Method, by a late Author in a Tract, entitled, *The Elements of Policy Civil and Ecclesiastical in a Mathematical Method.* The latter of these, as it makes the Church independent upon the State in *Temporals* as well as *Spirituals* (a manifest Error we Charge upon the Church of Rome) I shall leave for another Opportunity, and in the mean while content my self with considering his first part, as it has relation to the Civil State.

His first Proposition is, *If Government is founded upon the Consent of the People in a State of Nature, the Governour can have no more Power than every distinct Member had before that Compact, i. e. Can have no Power that was not first in the Persons that transfer'd it.*

Ans. This I allow as undeniable Matter of Fact: But he tells us, That if all Men are in a State of Equality, they cannot transfer a superior Power to an individual; because, according to his fourth Axiom, equal Powers added to equal, are still equal: But this Axiom I take to be manifestly false, for altho' equal Numbers added to equal are still Equal, i. e. in Opposition to Odd; yet is it as evident, that if two, in a State of Equality should by Compact, the one give up his Right to the other to be govern'd by him, the Person transferring, has not after such Compact, equal Power to the Person to whom it was transferr'd. A Servant at that Rate, after his Compact to serve his Master, has equal Right to Govern with his Master; an Assertion too absurd to be maintained. From whence it necessarily follows; 1st, That no Man having an Arbitrary Power over himself in a State of Nature, can subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another; because, according to Axi. 2^d, No one can transfer a Power he has not. 2^{dly}, That no body likewise having Power over the Life of another, any farther than the Law of Preservation gives it him, can transfer any more to the Sovereign. From whence it follows, 3^{dly}, That no Superior

perior has an Absolute Authority over another, he having no more *Power* than was first in the *People*. 4thly, That the *supream* *Power* must govern himself by those *Rules* which were agreed upon by the *People* at their *Incorporating* into the *Society*; these are the *Natural Consequences* hereof; but instead of these, our Author has inferred from his own Hypothesis; 1st, *That the Power of Life and Death cannot be transferred by Subjects to their Sovereign; because no Person, in a State of Nature, has Power over the Life of another.* Ans. 1st, *In a State of Nature* I grant no one has *Power* over the *Life* of another, since all are *Independent*; and therefore in such a *State* cannot *transfer* such a *Power* to their *Sovereign* which they have not themselves, which is what no *Body*, I know, contends for. But I believe our Author would here mean, That no *Body* has by the *Law of Nature* a *Right* over the *Life* of another, in a *State of War* with him, or else it will make nothing to his *Purpose*; but that every one has *Power* over his *Enemy* is apparent, 1st, Because *God* has given to every one by the *Law of Nature*, all Things necessary to his *Self-preservation*. 2dly, That therefore every one has a *Right* by the *Law of Self preservation*, to defend himself against his *Aggressor*, even to take away his *Life* who threatens him with *Destruction*. This is confessed by all; from whence I infer, 1st, That a *Person* has a *Power* over the *Life* of his *Enemy*. 2dly, That the *Community* also have a *Right*
to

to defend themselves against all *Attacks*, and therefore have a *Power* over the Life of a *Murderer*, who by this Act has declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be Slain as one destructive of *Society*; agreeable to the Notion of *Cain*, who cried out, *Every one that findeth me shall kill me.* 3dly, That therefore a Society may transfer a Power of preserving the Community against its Enemies, and consequently may transfer a *Power of Life and Death to the Sovereign.*

His second Inference is, *That all Men are still in a State of Equality, because no one can oblige another without his Consent.* *Ans.* I grant that all Men are at Liberty to incorporate into what Society they please, either one already formed, or to form a new one, till they have expressly or tacitly given their Consent to be subject to any one.

His third Inference is, *That no King can make Contracts to oblige his People, because no Obligation can arise from Equality of Power;* but since I have before shewn there is a Superiority of Power, this falls to the Ground.

The 2d Proposition is, *That granting a State of Nature, the Power of the Sovereign is but borrowed, and he is only the Representative of the People.* *Ans.* If by *Borrow'd*, he means so transferr'd as not to be taken again; I grant it. As also if, by a *Representative*, he means such a one who exercises a Power which was originally in another, but is now transferr'd not to be resumed; that is true also.

His

His first Inference from hence is, That *each Individual when he pleases, may resume his Power, declare War against the Commonwealth, Rob upon the Highway; which is but exercising the Power Nature has given him, nor can he be punished for Murder.* *Ans.* 1st, I deny that a Power once conveyed conditionally can be resumed if the Conditions are perform'd: Thus, if a Man sell his Estate for such a Sum of Money, he cannot take it again if this be paid.

2dly, That Nature never gave any Power to make *War* upon a *Commonwealth*, or to *prejudice* another; and therefore, what Power a Man never had he cannot resume.

3dly, That he may be punish'd for *Murder*, since every Community has, by the *Laws of Self preservation*, (*ut supra*) a Power and Right over the Life of a publick Enemy, as well as a private Man over one who threatens him with Destruction.

To confirm this, he adds a Reason; *Because, according to this Scheme, if any Power of Life and Death is vested judicially in a Sovereign, it must likewise be in every Individual.* I answer, That in a State of Nature, this Power was in the Hands of every Individual, to execute the Law of Nature against Transgressors; but when Men form'd themselves into Societies, this was given up to the Sovereign, and therefore a Criminal may be punish'd for *Murder*, granting a State of Nature.

Lastly

Lastly, he infers, *A Representative must be accountable to the Person he Represents.* Ans. And if it be said a *King* is accountable to his *People*, *i. e.* not as *King*, but when he does that for which he has no Authority, and consequently *Unking* himself; I see no Absurdity that will follow: As *King* it is true he cannot be resisted, much less be called to an Account; because no Inferior can punish a Superior, *i. e.* whilst he is a Superior; but to resist Force with Force, being the State of War that levels the Parties, and cancels all former Relation of Reverence or Superiority; I cannot see why he is not then *accountable to the People*.

The 3d Proposition is, *A Man (supposing a State of Nature) cannot oblige his Children yet Unborn, by his own Act, to submit to Government.* Ans. I grant *no Parent can oblige his Children* to be subject to any Government, they being at *Liberty* to chuse what Government they will; yet this he may do, That as he leaves them an Estate, which by his own Act he had subjected to such a Government, so if they will receive this so subjected, they must be subject to that Government, and receive it upon the same Condition their Ancestors did; and thus far, and no farther can he oblige his Children, if it may be called an Obligation.

His first Inference is, *All those Passages that command Obedience to Parents, nay even the Fifth Commandment is contradicted.* Ans. This is no Consequence at all, that if a Pa-

rent cannot oblige his Children, therefore this Doctrine contradicts the Scripture, commanding Obedience to Parents; unless our Author will shew, that the Scriptures by giving Obedience to Parents, give them a Right to their Children to submit to Government; an Assertion, I should be glad to have demonstrated, and which if he cannot do, his Conclusion is false.

As for his Conclusion of this *Argument*, with a little variation I grant it; *That those Rebels which make their Exit by way of Tyburn, are Martyrs for the glorious Cause of Slavery, and die for maintaining their Birth-right, and are the true genuine Tor—es.*

Proposition, 4. *If there was ever naturally a Right of Fathers over their Children, Men were not Born at that Time in a State of Equality.* *Ans.* By a State of Equality is meant to be independent one of another in respect to Civil Dominion, and therefore granting Children are dependent on their Parents as Parents, yet neither will this destroy a State of Nature, nor do our Author any good in his Political Dominion, as will appear in what follows.

Proposition 5. *That all Men naturally have a Right over their Children.* *Ans.* That Parents have a Right of Parental Dominion over their Children I grant; But does it hence follow, they have of *Absolute Monarch*? He tells us indeed in what follows, *That Kingly Power, as now exercised, seems a Branch of the Parental, and derives its Vigour therefrom;*

from, notwithstanding the Violence of *Usurpation* has disturbed that *Lineal Succession*; not that every *Parent* had the *supream Power*, but the *Right of Primogeniture* gave to the *Eldest*, the *supream Power* over the rest. *Ans.* Here our *Author* has inconsistently tumbled together two of his Arguments for *Absolute Monarchy*: He tells us it derives its vigour from *Parental Power*, i. e. (if I understand him aright) from that *Power of Dominion* *Parents* have over their *Children* by the *Right of Generation*; and yet he immediately tells us, That every *Parent* had not the *supream Power*, but the *Right of Primogeniture* gave it to the *Eldest*; so that *Absolute Monarchy* is derived from the *Right of Parents*, and yet being a *Parent*, gives no *Right*. Here he saw the *Right of Parents* would do him no good; since this would as well prove every *Parent* to have a *Right* to be *Absolute Monarch*; and therefore he adds the *Right of Primogeniture*, as foreseeing the other would be of no consequence, however this speed; and therefore as to this, when our *Author* will shew us, that the *Kingly Office* as now exercis'd, is by *Right of Primogeniture*, i. e. that all the different *Governours* in the *World*, whether in *Monarchical*, *Republican*, or *mixt Monarchy Governments*, all *Govern* by that *Right of Primogeniture*, i. e. of being next *Heir* to *Adam*, I will then become a *Convert* to his Cause; which if he cannot shew that so many may be next *Heir*, his Argument of *Absolute Monarch* by *Right*

of *Primogeniture* must drop, till he shews who is next Heir to *Adam*, and consequently *Absolute Monarch* over all the rest, which when he has done, I doubt not all Mankind will pay him *Obedience*; and not yet contented with these, he adds another, as being resolved to hit upon the Right at last, viz. That *Adam* being first created in the World, all Power was at that Time invested in himself, which extended over his Children when they came into the World. *Ans.* What Power is here contended for I cannot imagine; since I hope, our Author will allow, that at the Time of Creation, *Adam* was neither invested with *Parental* or *Monarchical Power*, before he had any one to exercise Dominion over; and therefore I easily grant him, that this Power did extend over his Children, when they came into the World: But that *Monarchical Power* (which is all that is contended for) did extend over his Children by right of *Creation*, is what I cannot conceive; *Creation* being no more than a beginning to Exist, and therefore if this gave *Adam* an *absolute Monarchical Power*, the Beasts might have had as good a Title as he, and certainly a more ancient.

As to his last, before he draws his Conclusion for *Absolute Monarchy* from *Parental Power*, comprehended in the Fifth Commandment, it may not be amiss for him to consider, that to *Honour thy Father* is unluckily added, and *thy Mother*; which shews that the Duty thence derived from *Children*,
is

is equally due to *both* Parents, and therefore that can be but an ill Fundamental for *Monarchy*, which is not placed in *one*, but *two* conjointly.

Proposition 6. *If Paternal Power extends to the same Actions that pertain also to the Civil, they must be mutual, i. e.* If the Parental Power extends to the same Actions, in the same respect (which he must mean if he will have it make any thing for his Cause) I grant they be *mutual*. But here let it be observ'd, that from Parents Power over their Children, can be drawn no Argument ; unless there may be so many Monarchs as are Parents, the right Parents have over their Children, being common to all ; besides it is common to *Mother* as well as *Father*, *ut supra* ; and therefore, tho' it be allowed that Men are born under a State of Parental Government, yet does it not thence follow, they are under a State of Monarchical : And therefore that this Parental Power did not Die in *Adam*, but was continued to after Ages, I grant, without seeing one Jot it will make for his Cause.

As for that our Author says, That *Force can give us a lawful Right of Life and Death over another*, is what I deny, till he has given some Proof of his Assertion ; not being oblig'd to believe it upon his Word. He tells us in his Note, that *Slavery was not of Divine or Antient Institution* ; and therefore I think, grants all that is contended for, *viz.* That no one has, either by a *Divine Right*,
a Power

a Power of *Absolute Monarch* over another, or by *Antient Institution*; and therefore I agree with him, That were there are any Slaves, there this Power was *unjustly* maintain'd; unless Force can give a lawful Right: For since no one has an Arbitrary Power over himself, he cannot transfer an Arbitrary Power to another; and therefore, *as our Author says*, each must be obtain'd by Power.

What Reason our Author has to *Tryumph*, as having confuted a *State of Nature*, by his unanswerable Arguments, let the Reader judge; but how he proves *Cain* suffer'd in a Judicial Way, which requires, that *who so sheddeth Man's Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed*; or even that he suffered at all, I cannot conceive.

I also agree with him, that Men did soon incorporate themselves into Societies, as finding the Inconveniencies in a State of Nature; and when our Author will shew from *Scripture*, the Divine Right of Princes to *Absolute Monarchy*, or an exact *Catalogue* of *Adam's Posterity*, that we may know who is *Absolute Monarch*, by the Right of *Primogeniture*; I will then shew him in the *Scriptures*, when Men *first* entered into *Societies*.

As for that He mentions of *Cursing and Blessing*, which was in *Noah*, and afterwards in *Isaac*, when he has shewn that *Monarchs* have this Power, and that by Right of *Primogeniture*, it may make something for his Purpose. But by the Way, we may observe, that

that in his Text alledged, *Gen. 27. 37.* the *Elder* were to serve the *Younger*, which destroys his Right of *Primogeniture*.

Proposition 7. Government is of Divine Right. To prove this, he argues, *If Paternal (i. e. Parental) Government is of Divine Right, because Obedience thereto is commanded in Scripture (as was proved by the 5th Prop.) so likewise all Government, to which Obedience is due in the same Manner, must be of Divine Right also, i. e. If the Right Parents have over their Children by Nature, or the natural Right of Parents over their Children (as he expresses it, Prop. 5.) be moreover confirmed to 'em, by sacred Writ; they have a Divine Right, over and above their Natural, to that Obedience which was given them by Nature, and so far their Parental Government is of Divine Right.* So likewise, all Government to which Obedience is required, in the same Manner, i. e. is confirmed by Scripture, is of *Divine Right* also; i. e. has a *Divine Right* to our Obedience also. In this Sense I grant it, and know of no other *Divine Right* of *Paternal Government*, prov'd under the 5th Proposition.

His 1st Conclusion is, *Hence no Government can be alter'd, or subverted, but by a Divine Command.* *Ans.* This does not follow from the foremention'd Explanation, since God only confirms that Government settled by Persons in a State of Nature, and therefore Government may be altered without a *Divine Command*; since whenever a Prince,
con-

contrary to the Trust repos'd in him, goes about to destroy his Subjects, the State of Nature again devolves upon the Subject, and they have the same Power to *subvert* or *alter* the Government as they had at first; and whenever another Government is *settled*, Obedience to it is confirmed by *Divine Command*.

His 2d Inference is, *Hence Subjects are oblig'd by the Law of God, to be under Government, and not to run into a state of equality.*

Ans. Till our Author establishes the *Divine Right* of Princes, upon a better Ground than that of confirming the Natural, this must be denied.

Proposition 8. *The Manner according to different Customs of Nations, in designing the Person that is to Govern, alters not the Nature of the Authority, which is nevertheless from God, i. e. as Men at first in a State of Nature, have differently incorporated themselves into Societies, and this Power in the Supream, was confirm'd by God; so the different Customs of Nations, in designing the Person or Persons to govern them, alters not the Nature of their Authority, when so constituted, which is nevertheless from God.* As such I grant it, but otherwise it is not proved.

As for that Right by *Cession*, mention'd in the Note crept into the *Margin*, I answer, That the *Legislatives* cannot transfer the *Right* of Government to any other than the People gave it, according to Proposition 1. since they are only in *Trust*.

That

That *Conquest* cannot give a *Right*, I agree with our Author ; because no one, has naturally a Right over another, without his Consent. Also granting him, That Governments were at first Hereditary, i. e. that People at first subjected themselves to a Prince and his Heirs ; yet as no Father can oblige his own Child, by any Act of his, therefore others were born in a State of *Liberty*, and might then settle what Form they would.

As to his last, *That there is Powers invested in the Sovereign, which were never in the People, by the 1st Proposition*, I entirely deny ; but at the same time allow him, that *He derives his Authority from God, as a Mayor of a Corporation does his Powers from a Sovereign ; tho' he be first elected by the commonalty*, i. e. when chosen by the People, is confirmed by God, as a Mayor when chosen, is by the King.

Proposition 9. *The Supream Power is irresistible.* *Ans.* That the Supream Power is irresistible, I grant ; because, *as before*, no *Inferior* can punish a *Superior*, i. e. whilst he is a *Superior* ; but at the same time, I deny a *Prince* to be *Supream*, when he invades the Trust reposed in him ; for since all Men are born in a State of equality, he is no otherwise Superior to another, than as they have resign'd themselves to be govern'd by him ; and therefore when he breaks in upon the People's Priviledges, never subjected to him, he ceases to be *Supream* ; and so may be Re-

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sisted.

sisted. Not that he is immediately to be *Resisted* by *Force of Arms*, for *Force* must be opposed to nothing but unjust and unlawful *Force*; and where a Man is oppress'd, and there is a Law which is open, he may that way be reliev'd; but he is to use *Force* only when this Appeal is hindred, and the Prince breaks thro' his *Laws* to set up his *Arbitrary Will*, and by those and such like Proceedings shews, the State is in *manifest Danger* to be *subverted*; then it is alone, that *Force* takes Place; and then he may be *Resisted*.

As to his other, *That no other Power in the same Society, can interfere with the supream Power*, I grant. What then?

Proposition 10. *The supream Power being in one, or many, is the Difference between a Republick and a Monarchy.* This I grant.

Inference 1. *Hence these numerous Declarations in Parliament, that the King is Subject to God alone, are so many Proofs, that England is no Republick, consequently the Supream Power is in the King.* Ans. That the King of England, as King, is Subject to God alone, I grant; as also, that the supream executive Power is in the King of England, I grant to; (if it will do our Author any good) and therefore may in a tolerable Sense, be called *Supream*; not that he has in himself all the *Supream Power*, which is that of Lawmaking; as well as the other; but because he has in him the *supream Execution*: As also that he has no *Legislative Superior* to him; there being no Law made without his Consent;

sent. Since therefore he has not all the *supream Authority*, we can by no Means conclude *England* to be a *Monarchical Government*, but rather (*as others better define it*) a mixt Monarchy ; because part of the *supream Power* is in one solely, and part in one common to more.

Inference 2. *Hence all Governments in the World are Republicks, where the King has not the supream Power.* *Ans.* All Governments in the World, where the *Supream, Executive, and Legislative Power* is placed equally in more Hands than one, are Republicks ; but where it is part in one solely, and part in his Hands common to more, there it may be called mixt Monarchy ; but where it is one alone, there it is a Monarchy, (*as Tertullian*) quoted by our Author, defines it.

Proposition 11. *The Supream Power must be placed in such a Manner, that in Cases of emergency, it may be capable of acting.* *Ans.* This I grant, without seeing any thing it will make for his Hypothesis.

Proposition 12. *The Supream Power cannot be in Kings, Lords, and Commons jointly ; if the King has a Power of calling and dissolving Parliaments. To prove which, 'tis said, the Part cannot be the whole, yet the Part is essential to the whole ; when therefore Part of the supream Power is dissolv'd, the supream Power then ceases to be.* *Ans.* I grant, that when Part of the *Legislative Power* is dissolved, the *supream Power* ceases to be whole, because a Part is essential to the whole.

Secondly he tells us, *That Power which can restrain the other, is superior. If therefore the King can dissolve the Two Houses, he is a Superior.* *Ans.* The Power of dismissing or assembling the Parliament plac'd in the Executive, makes it not superior to it ; but is only a *Fiduciary Trust* put into the Hands of the Prince, not to exercise at his Pleasure, but so as to be most for the good of the Commonwealth, as the Change of Affairs may occur : There being not always business for them to do.

Proposition 13. *All Governments are Absolute in such a Sense, That there must be in them a supream Power, from which there is no Appeal.* *Ans.* That there is in all lawful Governments, such a supream Power from which there is no Appeal, I grant ; without all his needless Proof, and see what he will make of it. Hence he tells us, if *Absolute Governments are Tyrannical, all Governments are so, because all are Absolute.* *Ans.* In a lawful Government, there may be an Absolute Power, from which there is no Appeal, i. e. whilst the Prince Acts within his *Charter* ; but I deny that a *Tyrannical Government*, is a Government ; having no such Power transferr'd from the subject ; and therefore from such a one there may be an Appeal, to that *Liberty* which is devolved upon the Subject ; and therefore all sorts of Government, as they are not *Absolute*, so have they no Right to *Tyranny*.

Proposition 14. *The Laws that are Barrier between the Prerogative Royal, and the Liberties of the Subject, are not destructive of the Supream Power, in the Hands of the Prince.*

Ans. That the Laws are not destructive of the supream Power, that is in the Hands of the Prince, I easily allow, i. e. of the Executive, and Part of the Legislative. But I cannot see, how any Thing can be concluded from hence in favour of Tyranny, since that was a Power never in his Hands. And as for that it is said, *He can dissolve his Restraint to his Subjects*; I think he manifestly thereby dissolves them from their Obedience, which was only agreed to upon Terms.

Proposition 15. *The Letter of the Civil Law has no external Force, without a Power to execute these Laws.* *Ans.* This Proposition is true.

Proposition 16. *The Supream executive Power, taken in such a sense, as borrowed from the Legislative Power, is absur'd.* *Ans.* There is no one (I know of) contends that it is borrowed from the Legislative; but it is a Fiduciary Trust given him by the People: So that our Author can make Objections for us, and Answer 'em when he has done.

Proposition 17. *If the supream executive Power is taken in such a sense, as to suppose that no Laws can be executed, but by that Power, (which the Words certainly import) that Power is irresistible.* *Ans.* That the Prince is not to be resisted in the Execution of the Laws, is a Truth agreed on all Hands; and therefore

fore Kings of *England* being vested with this Power, ought not to be resisted in the execution of the Laws against *Rebels* and *Traytors*, a Thing too much practis'd by our Nonresisting *Casuits*. As to what he says, *We may see to this Doctrine, the Hands of the whole Body of the Clergy of our Church*, I believe he might have added, and of *Laity* too ; yet I wish I could say, we may see all their Hands, or *Doctrines* either, against the late Rebellion, which would have been for the Credit of our Author's Party.

Proposition 18. *The supream Power is an indivisible Point. It is absurd, That were the supream Power is plac'd in many, That one part of the Body should have a Coercive Power over the other, and be accountable to the other at the same time. Ans.* I know of no other Power being in the Hands of the Prince alone, than the *executive Power* ; which being no more than putting the Laws in *Execution*, according to the trust reposed in him by the *People* ; is in that allowed to be supream, and not accountable to any : But if he should exercise a *Coercive Power* he has no Right to, I see no absurdity that will follow, if he be accountable to the other ; being by that, not *Supream* but *Equal*. And therefore allowing the King of *England*, such a Power over the Lords and Commons ; yet is he not vested with the Total supream Power, being only to execute the Laws they before consented to be Subject to, and consequently is not Absolute Monarch. Thus

Thus, (to conclude in my Author's own Words) have I finish'd my Argument ; If my Adversaries will Answer me in a rational Way, they must either find fault with our Author's Definitions or Axioms, or with my Conclusions drawn in good Part from them. If this cannot be done, the Schemes stands unshaken by any Rational Powers : But if any successfully overturn my Arguments, the Fault must be my own, for not finding better for a Cause enriched with the most Noble Truths, adorned with Crowns of Martyrdom, and patronized by all Good Men.

F I N I S.
